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I 
 
 
 
According to Grotius, ‘Right, properly speaking … consists in leaving others in quiet 
Possession of what is already their own, or in doing for them what in Strictness they may 
demand.’ 
Within the sphere of Right “properly speaking” – that which “in strictness” may be 
demanded – Grotius includes  
the Abstaining from that which is another’s, and the Restitution of what we have of 
another’s, or of the Profit we have made by it, the Obligation of fulfilling Promises, 
the Reparation of a Damage done through our own Default, and the Merit of 
Punishment among Men. 
He thinks the “Fountain” of this notion is the “Social Faculty”: the faculty or ability to live 
peacefully together and engage in cooperative exchange. However,  
From this Signification of Right arose another of larger Extent. For by reason that 
Man above all other Creatures is endued not only with this Social Faculty of which 
we have spoken, but likewise with Judgment to discern Things pleasant or hurtful, 
and those not only present but future, and such as may prove to be so in their 
Consequences; it must therefore be agreeable to human Nature, that according to the 
Measure of our Understanding we should in these Things follow the Dictates of a 
right and sound Judgment, and not be corrupted either by Fear, or the Allurements of 
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present Pleasure, nor be carried away violently by blind Passion. And whatsoever is 
contrary to such a Judgment is likewise understood to be contrary to Natural Right, 
that is, the Laws of our Nature. 
… And to this belongs a prudent Management in the gratuitous Distribution of Things 
that properly belong to each particular Person or Society, so as to prefer sometimes 
one of greater before one of less Merit, a Relation before a Stranger, a poor Man 
before one that is rich, and that according as each Man’s Actions, and the Nature of 
the Thing require; which many both of the Ancients and Moderns take to be a part of 
Right properly and strictly so called; when notwithstanding that Right, properly 
speaking, has a quite different Nature, since it consists in leaving others in quiet 
Possession of what is already their own, or in doing for them what in Strictness they 
may demand. 1 
So Grotius allows that there is a wider sense of right, which takes account of pleasant or 
hurtful consequences: it is the object of “right and sound judgement” based on “Natural Right” 
in the broader sense of accordance with the “Laws of our Nature.” However Right in this 
wider sense does not, unlike Right properly speaking, entail the notion of legitimate demand.   
In an editorial note Barbeyrac gives some examples to explain the author’s meaning:  
When we forbear striking, wounding, robbing, injuring or defaming any one, we only 
leave him in quiet Possession of what was his own; for the good Condition of his 
Limbs, his Goods, and Reputation, are actually his own, and no Man has a Right to 
dispossess him of them, while he has done nothing to deserve such Treatment. When 
we repair the Damage he has sustained in his Person, Goods, or Reputation, whether 
designedly or through Inadvertency, we restore what we had taken from him, and 
what was his own, which he had a strict Right to demand. When we keep our Word to 
him, when we perform our Promise, or make good an Engagement, we do not indeed 
restore, what he was once in actual Possession of; but we perform what he might 
strictly require at our Hands. All this relates to the Law of Nature, taken in the strict 
and proper Sense of that Term; not to mention the Punishment of the Guilty … When 
[in contrast – JS] the Sovereign refuses to bestow an Employment on one of his 
Subjects, who is worthy of it, or prefers one less capable of discharging the Duty, or 
does not reward the Person according to his Merit, he does indeed offend against the 
Law of Nature, taken in an improper, and less [more? – JS] extensive Sense, 
according to our Author’s Ideas; but he does that Subject no Wrong, properly 
speaking, because he had no full and rigorous Rights to demand the Employment, or 
the Reward. The same is to be said of those, who refuse Relief or Assistance to the 
poor and miserable, not in extreme Necessity; for in that Case they have a strict Right 
to demand what they want …2 
Some may question Barbeyrac’s example of the Sovereign. A Sovereign is an entity acting in 
a public capacity, not a private person, so arguably it does wrong a person who should have 
been appointed on merit. It is not simply prudent, or beneficial, to appoint the best-qualified 
person to a public office, many would nowadays say – rather, to be assessed for the 
appointment solely on appropriate qualification is the person’s right “properly so-called”. But 
our difference with Barbeyrac here is not to do with the contrast itself. It arises from the 
stricter distinction we draw between public and private spheres: our conviction that 
                                                      
1 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited by Richard Tuck, 3 vols, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund, 2005, vol. I, pp. 87-9, my emphasis. (That one may legitimately demand to be left in quiet 
possession of one’s own is understood.) 
2 Tuck, ed., note 7, pp.88-9. The Rights of War and Peace was first published in 1625. Barbeyrac’s 
edition of the work appeared in Latin in 1720, in a French translation in 1724, and in an English 
translation (used in Richard Tuck’s edition for the Liberty Fund) in 1738.  
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Sovereignty is a purely public role and our beliefs about what any person may legitimately 
demand in the public sphere. 
The Grotian contrast itself is, I believe, sound. However important questions arise 
about the other side of it, the side that is not a matter.of rights in the strict sense. We often 
distinguish between prudential and moral good, or again, particular and impartial good. These 
distinctions are noticeably not made in the passage from Grotius. For his purposes they may 
not have been needed. But they become significant if we wish to ask about the normative 
significance of rights, that is, about how they fit into the domain of practical reasons. One 
question here is how the category of rights fits with the category of the moral, another is how 
these categories fit into, or with, practical reasons in general. These questions lead us to ask 
what is meant by “may” in “what in Strictness they may demand.” It is this conceptual issue 
that I want to address in this essay. To introduce it, we should attend to some questions of 
definition.  
When a person has a right, his possession of that right is constituted by positive or 
negative demands he may make on the actions of others. Having any particular right consists 
in the possibility of legitimate demands that others do or refrain from doing so-and-so 
(honour their promise, not take one’s computer without one’s permission, etc.). The right in 
question is constituted by the legitimacy of these possible demands. Further, it is definitive of 
“Right, properly speaking” that such demands may be enforced, and that when others flout 
them by their doing, omitting or refraining there is a presumptive though defeasible claim to 
compensation.  
In light of these points, consider the following definition 
(A) X has a right that Z Ys if and only if it is permissible (absent special 
circumstances) for X or X’s agent freely to demand that Z Ys, and (where 
appropriate/relevant) to demand compensation for X from Z in the event of damage 
resulting from Z’s non-compliance. 3 
The definition is ‘Grotian’ in appealing to the notion of a permissible free demand. Its 
definiens is normative, since it invokes a notion of permissibility. That is as it should be – 
certainly the notion of a right is a normative notion. (We are not concerned here with purely 
positive-legal rights.) But what notion of permissibility is in play? The obvious answer is that 
what is meant is moral permissibility, where an action is morally permissible if and only if it 
is not morally wrong.  
 Note then the requirement that the permissible demand should be freely made. The 
impermissible may become morally permissible under coercion. So for example it may be 
morally permissible to lie or break a promise under coercion. Thus (in an example put to me 
by Allan Gibbard) suppose a hostage-taker forces his hostage, at the point of a gun, to 
demand that the government releases some prisoners. It is morally permissible for the hostage 
to make that demand, but the hostage is acting under coercion, not freely. So it does not 
follow that it is the hostage’s right that the government should release the prisoners, nor that 
the government has a duty of right to the hostage to release the prisoners, that is (following 
Barbeyrac’s criterion), that it wrongs the hostage if it does not release them – whether or not 
it has a moral obligation to release them.  
 What about the notion of demand? A demand is more than a mere request. The notion 
is conceptually linked to the possibility or probability of some form of compulsion or 
exaction; where a demand is clearly not enforceable it can seem empty.  Even so, a demand 
may be permissible even if it is not actually possible to enforce it; it is for example 
                                                      
3 I argued for a version of this definition in John Skorupski, ‘Human Rights’ in Samantha Besson and 
John Tasioulas, eds., Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 340 – 357 , and The 
Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 12. 
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permissible to demand the return of the hostage even if we have no power to enforce it. (And 
to say the demand is permissible is not to say it is wise.) Of course enforcement, compulsion, 
exaction, don’t necessarily take the form of physical coercion. Even to say that you are 
demanding something is already to exercise a certain degree of exaction; demand is a form of 
command. You don’t demand, as against request, things in polite company, even when you 
have a right to do so. To demand is to imply that enforcement would, if necessary be 
permissible; that given that the demand has been made, the other person has no option but to 
comply.  
Permissible enforcement must be proportionate to the seriousness of a right-
infringement. Hence, just because demanding is already a form of enforcement, when a right 
is sufficiently trivial it may be disproportionate even to make demands. Suppose that we have 
previously agreed to have lunch together – and you have not pressured me unacceptably into 
that agreement. Then you have a right to expect me to be there, a right to be told in advance 
(if possible) that I can’t come, and a right to remonstrate if I fail to turn up without bothering 
to tell you and without any excusing reasons. But, as often with small rights, it might well be 
foolish or petty-minded to act on these rights, by actually remonstrating, let alone demanding 
compensation.  
Nonetheless, where harm or damage is caused to the right-holder by an infringement 
it is permissible for the right-holder to demand and enforce compensation. As ever, such 
permissibility is subject to defeat by weightier moral grounds, and what is permissible is 
proportionate enforcement of proportionate compensation, taking into account the 
circumstances of the infringer. But the right-holder may not be capable of issuing demands: 
infants, people with certain kinds of mental illness, and animals are not able to do so. It 
seems specious to say that they are still permitted to issue demands, though incapable of 
doing so; yet we surely do not want to deny that they have rights solely in virtue of that point. 
Hence my definition allows that an agent acting for the right-holder may demand on the 
agent’s behalf. More generally, if you have a right to demand others typically have a right to 
demand for you. You may demand that a thief returns what he has stolen from you; others too 
may demand that he returns it to you. 
 
 
II 
 
 
I have agreed with Grotius that rights proper are demarcated by the criterion of what a person 
may demand, in the sense of demand just discussed. I also broadly agree with him about the 
content of rights proper, as indicated by his list of examples. However the substantive extent 
of rights is a question in its own right, and not our topic. Here our concern is with the 
conceptual relations between rights, morality and practical reasons. For this purpose we need 
to think about how to categorise normative considerations that lie outside the sphere of right 
strictly so-called.  
In the passage I quoted Grotius presents a rather disparate list of these considerations 
as all falling under the “Dictates of a right and sound judgment.” Right or sound judgement, 
he tells us, attends to pleasant and hurtful consequences, both present and future; also to 
“prudent Management in the gratuitous distribution of things”, that is, distributions where no-
one has pre-existing claims of right on that which is distributed. He emphasises that such 
judgement raises no issues of right strictly so called; but he also accepts that it too is 
regulated by practical-normative principles that arise from our nature. Natural law in this 
broader sense is simply the domain of practical-normative truths as such – of true 
propositions about practical reasons. This is a very broad sense. Effectively Grotius makes no 
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distinction other than that between practical norms in general and norms that determine strict 
rights in particular. Fair enough, given his aims. But if we seek an overall picture of practical 
normativity, and in particular the place of right proper within it, we have to inquire further. 
It has seemed obvious to many that the most fundamental distinction in the sphere of 
practical normativity is between the moral and the non-moral (prudential, aesthetic). It is the 
most fundamental distinction, because morality is in a certain sense supreme. It is a moral 
question, something decided from the moral point of view, whether any particular choice 
raises moral issues, and it is likewise a moral question whether a given demand is legitimate, 
so that what rights there are is also determined from the moral point of view. Morality is, 
furthermore, supreme in the sense that it is categorical – if there is a moral obligation to do 
something there is uniquely sufficient reason to do that thing.  
Kant articulates this picture when he divides morality, the sphere of categorical 
imperatives, into the doctrine of “virtue” (Tugend) and the doctrine of “right” (Recht). There 
is the overall sphere of moral obligation, and within that lies the specific domain of duties of 
right – where A has a duty of right to B to do something if and only if A has a right that B do 
that thing (and has not waived it).4 
Then there are many dictates of right and sound judgment, whether trivial or 
important, that involve neither duties of right nor moral obligations.5 A judgment about 
whether it is best to walk to the cinema or go by bus is one example among a myriad others. 
Right and sound judgment can be applied to that practical question as to any other. So we 
have a three-way division between non-moral judgments about practical reasons, dictates of 
moral obligation, and demands of strict right. But it is the moral point of view that determines 
where the lines between these should be drawn. 
 There is no sign of this three-way distinction in the passages from Grotius or the 
comment by Barbeyrac. However my definition of rights is compatible with it. Indeed it 
presupposes a distinct concept of the moral if, as I suggested above, we interpret the notion 
of permissibility that it deploys as moral permissibility. Yet how else should we interpret it? 
What does Grotius mean by ‘may’ when he speaks of “what in Strictness they may demand”?  
Suppose we interpret the statement that it is permissible for X to demand Y as 
meaning that X has a right to demand Y. (A) then becomes: 
(B) X has a right that Z Ys if and only if X or X’s agent has a right (absent special 
circumstances) freely to demand that Z Ys, and (where appropriate/relevant) to 
demand compensation for X from Z in the event of damage resulting from Z’s non-
compliance. 
This, I believe, is true. But obviously it cannot serve as a definition, since the word ‘right’ 
appears on the right hand side. In contrast, the issue of circularity does not arise if we 
interpret ‘permissible,’ in (A), as meaning ‘morally permissible. The claim that (A) is a 
definition can then stand. The definition, moreover, is consistent with the truth of (B). 
Plausibly, if (and only if) it is morally permissible to make a demand then it is morally 
permissible to demand that others should not interfere with one’s demanding. In which case 
(B) follows, given (A).  
 
                                                      
4 “What essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right is that external 
constraint to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the former is based only on 
free self-constraint.” Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Academie edition, 6: 383. But as we shall 
see in section IV, it is not quite right to put these two kinds of ‘duty’ on a level, which is why 
I have distinguished between moral obligations  and duties of right. 
5 Kant thought he could handle this point in terms of the contrast between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives, wrongly in my view. 
 6 
 
III 
 
So far, then, we have a comprehensive picture in which right strictly so-called is a sub-
category of the moral, with moral obligation in turn divided from decision-making which is 
sensitive to practical reasons but raises no moral questions. It is a plausible picture. The 
distinctions between the moral and the non-moral, and between duties of right and moral 
obligations, are at least at one level readily comprehensible. Yet it is also true that the 
underlying idea, that of the supremacy of the moral point of view is not uncontroversial. The 
most influential critic in recent philosophy has been Bernard Williams. However I want to 
take account of two earlier, historically important discussions. 
There is something plausible, or at least interesting, in the idea suggested in their 
different ways by Hegel and by Nietzsche, namely, (i) that the moral point of view is a 
modern development, perhaps out of Christianity, and (ii) that the concept of rights is 
somehow more primitive or more basic than morality, and not simply a division or 
constituent of it. For rights of some kind must be acknowledged, more or less, in any society 
which functions at all as a society. But on the face of it there could be societies in which the 
‘moral point of view’ has no purchase. In such societies, if there are or have been any, the 
practical-normative landscape certainly encompasses rights, which define peaceful 
coexistence and exchange – the “fountain” of Grotius’ social faculty – whose preservation 
where necessary by force is accepted as legitimate. Beyond these there is simply better or 
worse practical judgment, responding to heterogeneous collections of ends, ideals, customs, 
affiliations, personal commitments.  
This totality, including rights, constitutes Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, as he envisages it 
existing for example among the Homeric Greeks, or in the time of Oedipus as presented by 
Sophocles. That the moral point of view is, in contrast, a modern development is implied in 
Hegel’s treatment of abstract right and morality (what he calls Moralität6) in the Philosophy 
of Right. There he treats the latter as a development from the former. He sees it as an aspect 
of the overall modern development of interiority, working in this case through reflection on 
the meaning of punishment, remorse and atonement.7 The moral point of view marks out the 
difference between the modern reflective version of Sittlichkeit and its primitive, unreflective 
and customary form. Hegel sees this transition as a dialectically inevitable advance of the 
spirit, even though he has much to say about the possibilities of abstract and individualist 
distortion that it brings with it. Thus in Hegel’s conception the emergence of a clear-cut 
three-way division between rights, morality, and the non-moral sphere of particularity is a 
product of that general dialectic of rational differentiation.  
The Nietzschean view, by which Williams was influenced, also conceives of morality 
as a modern development, but, in short, a bad one. Despite this obvious difference in the way 
he and Hegel evaluate the development, what Nietzsche says about morality – the slave 
value-system – is in some aspects similar to what Hegel says about Moralität. Nietzsche too 
holds that the moral point of view is a development towards interiority, or subjectivity. He 
agrees that it is, in one way, progressive – it makes man a reflective, interesting animal. Even 
more strikingly, in The Genealogy of Morals (Essay 2) and elsewhere Nietzsche presents 
right, including the right to give one’s word and accept responsibility, as intrinsic to value 
                                                      
6 There is some difficulty in translating this term. Hegel has in mind a certain kind of moral 
consciousness. I’ve used both ‘moral point of view’ and ‘morality’, as appropriate. 
7 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Parts I & II, especially §§102-102, ‘Punishment and 
Revenge’, and §104, ‘Transition from Right to Morality.’ 
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systems which predate that which emerges from Christianity and develops into modern 
morality. Legality come before morality. 
 Without in any way reading either Hegel or Nietzsche back into Grotius, we can say 
that the view of the relationship between rights and morality that we find in their different 
ways in Hegel and Nietzsche has elements in common with Grotius’ picture of the practical-
normative domain. This domain of norms arises from human beings’ natural concerns: the 
pursuit of happiness, of natural ideals of desert, of equity, of honour, of deep agent-relative 
commitments, and so on. Within that domain, strict right, demandability, arises from the 
imperative need to live and exchange peacefully with others. In this picture there is no special 
role for a distinctive and dominant moral point of view. A present-day critic of morality 
could hold that this is a healthier picture, inasmuch as it consigns disciplinary functions 
solely to the enforcement of strict rights, and leaves the rest to the private domain of more or 
less personal preference. It fits with one kind of modern liberalism, which treats rights as 
socially enforceable, while treating practical judgement as a private matter, even it 
acknowledges that such judgement can be objectively better or worse. 
Hegel and Nietzsche differ of course about whether the development of the moral 
point of view is, overall, good. Hegel sees it as a development towards freedom, Nietzsche 
sees it as the emergence of a kind of bondage. My own view follows Hegel. Incidentally, in 
many ways Williams’ criticisms fit into the Hegelian critique of Moralität and of Kant. They 
overlap strongly with Hegel’s criticisms of the moral point of view, while at the same time 
Williams does not really follow up very far the Nietzschean assault on post-Christian 
liberalism and democracy.  
The Hegelian approach produces a conception of liberalism very different to that 
referred to in the last paragraph but one. However I want to return to the issue of priority: in 
Hegel’s treatment the notion of rights is envisaged as existing before the development of the 
moral point of view. Moreover Hegel sees this as a conceptual as well as a historical priority 
(in his terms, a dialectical priority). Does this not lead to a difficulty for my definition? Even 
granting that the moral point of view is part of a fully developed and differentiated 
conception of normativity – as Hegel thinks – can it be intruded into the notion of a right?  
Since right comes before the moral point of view, to which such a notion as moral 
permissibility essentially belongs, surely the latter notion cannot be part of the notion of right. 
Having a right is not having a moral permission, but having a right, to demand – as stated in 
(B). And obviously on this view of right as a primitive normative concept my attempt to 
define it collapses.  
 
IV 
 
There is certainly something very distinctive about the feel of rights. It is partly a matter of 
felt stringency, recognized early on by children as well as by adults. I agree that it is also 
partly a matter of felt priority – as discussed in the last section, rights seem to belong to a 
more primitive stratum of practical normativity, so that defining them in terms of moral 
permissibility has an appearance of putting the cart before the horse.  
An interesting difference between moral obligations and duties of right can seem to 
give credence to this thought. Rights and duties of right, unlike moral obligations, depend on 
what the facts are, not on what the agent is warranted in thinking the facts are.  
Suppose a lost will instructs that an estate should be left to a particular person. The 
executors have no idea of its existence. The will has fallen down the back of a very heavy 
mahogany sideboard and the legitimate heir is languishing in some distant part of the world. 
Nonetheless, that particular person has a right to the estate, and hence – given how I have 
defined duties of right – the executors have a corresponding duty of right to make it over to 
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him or her. They have that duty of right even while they are ignorant of it. But since their 
ignorance is entirely innocent they transgress no moral obligation, do nothing that is morally 
wrong, in failing to carry it out. Nonetheless, if they find the will they then have a moral 
obligation to make good the situation by carrying out its terms.8 Rights, and hence duties of 
right, are fact-dependent, not warrant-dependent.   
Moral obligations, in contrast are warrant-dependent. What moral obligations I have 
depends on what I have warrant, sufficient reason, to believe to be the case. If I have warrant 
to believe that you urgently need medical attention, then I have a moral obligation to get it, 
even if in fact you don’t need it. If you do need it, but I have no reason at all to believe that 
you do, I have no moral obligation to get it. In general the link between moral obligations and 
duties of right is that one has a prima facie moral obligation to fulfil duties of right that one 
has sufficient reason to believe that one has.  
Why are moral obligations warrant-dependent? The point, I think, is that morality is 
for self-determiners (Hegel’s ‘moral subjects’), and self-determiners must be able to know, in 
a concrete situation, what moral obligations they have, if any. This question must be open to 
reflection, in just the way that the general question of what I have warrant to believe and do is 
open to reflection.9 I must be able to determine for myself what my warrants are, and what 
my moral obligations are: reflection on moral obligation occupies the same role in first-
person deliberation as reflection on warrant. This gives rise to what Hegel calls ‘the right [or 
principle] of the subjective will’; a principle, as he emphasises, that is fundamental to the 
moral point of view. If one has a moral obligation one can in principle tell that one has.  
What about duties of right, then, why are they fact-dependent? The key here, I believe 
(with Grotius), is that rights are the determinants of legitimate social interaction. They are the 
permissions and prohibitions whose complex constitutes the constantly changing structure of 
social relations, and this structure is grounded in the facts. What makes the heir the heir is the 
facts about what was written in the will, and the facts which make it a due and proper will. 
Given those facts, no-one else is the heir, whatever the executors may have reason to believe. 
Rights are locked to facts about what has actually happened, facts that exist independent of 
whether we are warranted in thinking that they do. 
So does my definition put the cart before the horse? 
The answer turns on the notion of permissibility which it deploys. Rights consist in 
the permissibility of demands, but while this notion of permissibility is clearly normative it 
seems tendentious to equate it straightforwardly with the notion of moral permissibility – for 
this seems to import moral notions into every society which recognizes some demands placed 
by people on other people as legitimate. (And what conceivable society would not do that?). 
But, on the Hegel/Nietzsche view, the horse of rights comes before the cart of morality. Or to 
move hastily to an apter metaphor, the foundation of rights is needed for any shared house, 
whereas the upper floor of morality may or may not come later. 
‘Permissible’ must mean more than ‘not against right and sound judgment.’ That 
would be too weak. But perhaps full-blown moral permissibility is too strong? I think the 
notion of blameworthiness can help us. I have argued that we can characterize morality in 
terms of blameworthiness, where the core of blame is understood as an emotion or set of 
                                                      
8 Subject to moral obligations that may have arisen in the interim. (I used this example in The 
Domain of Reasons.) The discussion in this section follows the longer discussion in Domain 
of Reasons, with some minor changes. 
9 Which is not to say that the question of what there is sufficient reason to do is open to 
reflection. For further discussion of the relation between reasons and warrant, see The 
Domain of Reasons, ch. 5. 
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emotions, with a characteristic disposition.10 The disposition is to exclude the person blamed, 
though not unconditionally – when the disposition is working properly, it inherently 
envisages reconciliation in the presence of remorse. This disposition, and its social 
ramifications, constitutes the core discipline of blame. Note then the difference between this 
discipline and the discipline that attends rights-violation. The latter may include violent 
enforcement, loss of freedom and the extraction of compensation, the former does not, 
though its recourse to withdrawal of recognition can in many ways be just as painful. 
Furthermore blame, at least when fully developed into the moral point of view, requires some 
form of mens rea on the part of the person blamed, whereas it’s not clear that that applies to 
the discipline of rights. This is a tricky question, but at least it seems that compensation may 
sometimes legitimately be demanded even if the rights-violation was understandably 
unknown and therefore morally blameless. 
Now I find it hard to believe that there are or could be societies in which the 
sentiment of blame, with its related sentiments and movements of withdrawal of recognition, 
remorse and reconciliation does not exist.11 It seems too basic a human phenomenon. In that 
minimal sense the elements of the moral are omni-present. But that does not mean that moral 
obligation is articulated and differentiated into a distinct system – that is the work of modern 
morality, including modern moral philosophy.12 
An action, one may say, is morally wrong just if (i) the agent has sufficient reason to 
believe that there are reasons not to do it, that is, he could warrantedly come to that 
conclusion if he thought through what he knows and (ii) those reasons not to do it are such 
that not to comply with them, when one has sufficient reason to believe that they obtain, is 
blameworthy. This account defines moral wrongness in terms of blameworthiness. It does not 
follow that one has the concept of the morally wrong, even if one has the concept of blame. 
Thus in the Grotian definition of rights one can take permissible demands to be demands 
which the demander is blameless in making. Elucidations and corrections to this definition 
are needed to get it right, because moral permissibility and blamelessness do not coincide.13 
Such corrections will move us closer to a clearly articulated conception of moral wrongness. 
Nonetheless, a society can have a conception of rights based on the core notion of blameless 
demands, without having a developed and differentiated notion of moral wrongness. In that 
sense at least, we can reject the accusation that the Grotian definition of rights puts the cart 
before the horse, while at the same time explaining its intuitive force. 
 
                                                      
10 The Domain of Reasons, chs 12 and 15 
11 Obviously this is an empirical question that could be investigated by anthropologists. 
Though empirical, it is also conceptually very elusive; but then anthropologists are trained to 
deal with such hermeneutic questions. However I haven’t found a substantial body of recent 
literature dealing with it. There is an older discussion of ‘shame’ and ‘blame’ cultures. On the 
case of the Homeric Greeks Bernard Williams should be mentioned again: see his Shame and 
Necessity, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993  
12 This is not to deny the role of ancient and especially mediaeval ethics – see T. H. Irwin, 
The Development of Ethics, Oxford 2007-9. Nonetheless it seems to me that the modern 
period, with its work of rational differentiation (of the kind described by Max Weber) is 
crucial. 
13 The Domain of Reasons, ch. 12. 
